

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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EXDIS

GENEVA FOR SALT AND CCD DELS

DEPT PASS TO SECDEF, NSC, AND USNMR SHAPE FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, FR
SUBJ: FRENCH DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS: MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR WARNKE

REF: STATE 043259

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN MARCH 14 MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR WARNKE, FRENCH DISARMAMENT COORDINATOR
TAITTINGER OUTLINED MORE DETAIL ON THE INDIVIDUAL
FRENCH INITIATIVES. THE MEETING COVERED THE FOLLOWING
SUBJECTS:

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--A NEW DISARMAMENT ENTITY TO REPLACE THE CCD.
--INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE VERIFICATION AGENCY.
--SPECIAL FUND FROM DISARMAMENT "SAVINGS."
--NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AND REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL
ARMS LIMITATIONS.
--EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. ON MARCH 14, ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE AND AMBASSADOR MET WITH GOF DISARMAMENT COORDINATOR TAITTINGER AND OTHER OFFICIALS TO REVIEW THE GOF SET OF PROPOSALS. AMBASSADOR WARNKE CAME TO PARIS AT THE INVITATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD, WITH WHOM HE HAD A BRIEF MEETING AT THE END OF THE TALKS. WARNKE DREW ON REFTTEL GUIDANCE IN COMMENTING ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH PROPOSALS.

3. WARNKE WELCOMED THE FRENCH INITIATIVES AS INDICATIONS OF A MORE ACTIVE FRENCH ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US-GOF DIALOGUE CAN CONTINUE ON FRANK AND REGULAR BASIS. TAITTINGER ENDORSED CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE STATING THAT HE WILL REPORT TO US RESULTS OF HIS BILATERALS ON THE FRENCH INITIATIVES WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW (NEXT WEEK) AND THE PRC THE FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. CREATION OF A NEW ENTITY TO REPLACE THE CCD: D'ABOVILLE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OUTLINED FRENCH THINKING AS THEY APPROACH THE SSOD. THE GOF BELIEVES THAT THE CURRENT "TROIKA STRUCTURE" (THE DIVISION OF CCD INTO EAST, WEST, AND THIRD WORLD GROUPS) IS A DRAWBACK IN THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE THIRD WORLD FEELS ITSELF UNINVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. THE CCD ADDS NOTHING TO THE SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE, NOR DOES IT
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PROCEED FROM THIRD WORLD INTERESTS. THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN THE CCD (E.G., MEXICO) CANNOT SPEAK FOR THEIR REGIONS. THE FRENCH ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ARRANGEMENT AT CCD IS AN HISTORICAL ANACHRONISM. THUS THE FRENCH PROPOSE:

(A) AN ENTITY WITH A MORE DIRECT LINK TO THE UN, POSSIBLY COMMITTEE I.

(B) A NEW ENTITY WITH INCREASED PARTICIPATION WOULD HAVE AN ELECTED PRESIDENCY AND MEMBERSHIP ELECTED ON A REGIONAL BASIS. ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD SIT IN THE NEW BODY. THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF ENHANCING POSSIBLE PRC PARTICIPATION, SINCE IT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY HAVE A SEAT AS A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER. THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDITIONALLY WOULD REFLECT A CERTAIN POLITICAL AND REGIONAL BALANCE. D'ABOVILLE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE FRENCH RECOGNIZE THAT THIS PROPOSAL PRESENTS SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR PRESENT CCD MEMBERS WHO WOULD NOT BE ASSURED OF ELECTION TO THE NEW BODY.

5. WARNKE RESPONDED WE SEE VALUE IN THE CCD BUT DO

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NOT RULE OUT IMPROVEMENT. WE ARE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ARRANGE-
MENT, BUT WE WOULD PREFER TO REFORM THE CCD RATHER
THAN TO JETTISON IT. THE CCD FUNCTIONS BY CONSENSUS.
THIS COULD BE UNDERMINED BY MORE DIRECT LINKAGE TO THE
UN AND WE MAY FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH MAJORITY
VOTES WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US OR OTHER MAJOR
COUNTRIES. THERE NOW IS AN INFORMAL AND WORKABLE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CCD AND THE UN AND A MORE
ORGANIC TIE IS OF DUBIOUS VALUE.

6. WARNKE CONTINUED THAT THE CURRENT CCD MEMBERSHIP
IS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT A REFLECTION OF THE
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES THERE IN ARMS CONTROL.
WE DO NOT NECESSARILY AGREE THAT A DIFFERENT CRITERIA
OF SELECTION WOULD ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL.

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IT IS CORRECT THAT MEXICO CANNOT SPEAK FOR ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT AN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE AS PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK FOR ALL OF A REGION. WARNKE NOTED THAT THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE RESENTMENT ON THE PART OF PRESENT CCD MEMBERS WHO WOULD BE DENIED SEATS IN A FUTURE ENTITY. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTION TO THE NEW ENTITY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE THAT THESE COUNTRIES HAVE ACQUIRED OVER THE YEARS.

7. IN REFERENCE TO THE AUTOMATIC INCLUSION OF PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, THIS COULD INCREASE RESENTMENT OF PRESENT CCD MEMBERS WHO MIGHT NOT RETAIN SEATS AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS WOULD MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE PRC APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. WARNKE ASKED IF PRIME MINISTER BARRE HAD DISCUSSED THE FRENCH INITIATIVES IN PEKING DURING HIS JANUARY TRIP.

8. TAITTINGER RESPONDED THAT IN PEKING BARRE HAD LITTLE DISCUSSION ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS WITH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE HAD SAID THEY FOUND THE SET OF PROPOSALS "INTERESTING." TAITTINGER SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH PRC REPS IN TWO WEEKS AND INFORM WARNKE OF THE OUTCOME.

9. TAITTINGER CLARIFIED AN EARLIER POINT BY SAYING THE GOF WOULD WISH TO TRANSFER THE CONSENSUS RULE AT CCD TO THE NEW ENTITY.

10. INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE VERIFICATION AGENCY:
FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, DE
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LACHARRIERE OUTLINED TENTATIVE SCOPE OF PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AS FOLLOWS:

(A) POWERS: THE GOF BELIEVES THAT A STATE WOULD BE COMMITTED TO RESPECT THE POWERS OF SUCH AN AGENCY ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH STATE CHOOSES TO COMMIT ITSELF. THERE WOULD BE AN EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWERS OF THE AGENCY AS DESCRIBED BELOW.

(B) COMPETENCE: DE LACHARRIERE SAID THE GOF WAS CONSIDERING A TRANSFER OF THE TASKS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL RE OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS TO THE NEW AGENCY. GOING BEYOND THIS, THE

NEW AGENCY WOULD HAVE COMPETENCE FOR VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT OR SECURITY ISSUES. THIS COULD INCLUDE AGREEMENTS ALREADY IN FORCE OR THOSE WHICH MAY BE SIGNED IN THE FUTURE. IN REGARD TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, THE RESOURCES OF THE NEW AGENCY WOULD BE ASSIMILATED WITH AND WOULD NOT REPLACE THESE. THE NEW AGENCY WOULD PLACE ITS CAPABILITIES AT THE DISPOSAL OF MEMBER STATES. ALL PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE NEW AGENCY. STANDARD CLAUSES FOR AGREEMENTS COULD BE DEVELOPED TO THIS END.

(C) COMPLAINTS: A REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION COULD BE FORWARDED TO THE AGENCY BY ANY MEMBER STATE OR BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. A COMPLAINT OR CHALLENGE COULD ARISE WHEN A STATE SUSPECTS THAT ANOTHER IS VIOLATING A COMMITMENT OR ENGAGING IN "SUSPICIOUS" ACTIVITY. IN SUCH CASE, THE AGENCY WOULD BE REQUESTED TO EXAMINE THE MATTER. HOWEVER, SUCH EXAMINATION COULD PROCEED ONLY IF THE CHALLENGED STATE SO AGREES. IF THE LATTER REJECTS SUCH INVESTIGATION, THE MATTER WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE LATTER WOULD JUDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND COULD REQUEST THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY TO

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PROCEED WITH AN INVESTIGATION WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE SUSPECTED OR CHALLENGED STATE.

(D) LINK TO UN: THE GOF BELIEVES IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR THE NEW AGENCY TO BE LINKED TO THE UN. A CHOICE CAN BE MADE BETWEEN A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OR A SUBSIDIARY ORGAN. IN THE CASE OF THE LATTER, THERE WOULD BE A LINK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE UN CHARTER. IN THE CASE OF A SPECIALIZED AGENCY, SOMETHING LIKE A WEIGHTED VOTING FORMULA MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

(E) ASSETS OR MEANS: DE LACHARRIERE OUTLINED THREE STAGES. IN THE FIRST THE AGENCY WOULD ESTABLISH AN INTERPRETIVE CENTER FOR "PRE-TREATED" DATA TO BE PROVIDED BY "SPECIAL POWERS."

COMMENT: WE INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN SANITIZED DATA PROVIDED BY THE SUPERPOWERS. END COMMENT.
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IN PHASE II THE AGENCY WOULD ORGANIZE COLLECTION OF DATA BY DIRECT LINKS TO THE SATELLITES OF "SPECIAL POWERS." IN PHASE III THE AGENCY WOULD OPERATE ITS OWN VERIFICATION SATELLITES. DE LACHARRIERE ADDED THAT THE TIMING OF MOVING FROM EACH PHASE WOULD BE CONDITIONED BY THE SUCCESS OF PREVIOUS STEPS. HE ADDED THAT THE GOF ESTIMATED THAT IT WOULD COST \$30 MILLION TO ESTABLISH THE CENTER FOR PHASE I. THE ANNUAL OPERATING COST WOULD BE ABOUT \$5 MILLION.

(F) FINANCES: FUNDS COULD BE DERIVED BY COMPULSORY LEVIES UNDER UN RULES OR BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS. THE LATTER COULD INCLUDE CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND BY THE "SPECIAL POWERS."

11. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AGENCY MIGHT BE OF SOME INTEREST, BUT THAT MANY DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE FACED. THESE WOULD VARY WITH EACH PHASE. IN THE THIRD PHASE, THE PRIMARY DIFFICULTY WOULD BE THE IMMENSE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THIS WOULD BE WORTH THE COST. DURING THE FIRST TWO PHASES THE US WOULD FACE DIFFICULTIES ON WHAT

"PRE-TREATED" DATA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE FULL CAPABILITY OF OUR SYSTEMS AS THIS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN SECURITY. WARNKE ALSO SAW POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN WHETHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERRIDE THE REFUSAL OF A STATE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY. WARNKE NOTED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL VETO COULD ALSO RAISE COMPLICATING FACTORS. HE WONDERED IF THE USSR WOULD COOPERATE. TAITTINGER RESPONDED THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO SET RULES WHICH
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WOULD OBSTRUCT US AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO VERIFICATION OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. HE ASKED FOR US SUGGESTIONS SO THAT THE GOF COULD IMPROVE ITS PROPOSAL.

12. SPECIAL DISARMAMENT FUND: GERGORIN, OF QUAI PLANNING STAFF, STATED THE GOF PROPOSE THIS FINANCIAL IDEA AS AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND THE NEEDS OF LDCS. GISCARD PROPOSED THE CREATION OF A \$1 BILLION INTERNATIONAL FUND TO BE CREATED BY EXPECTED SAVINGS WHICH WOULD ACCRUE OVER TIME FROM ARMS CONTROL. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD PROVIDE 50 PERCENT OF THE FUND. THE GOF WAS CONSIDERING PROPOSING THE PROPORTION OF PAYMENT TO BE ALLOCATED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES, BECAUSE THIS IS THE ONLY PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RELIABLE DATA. THE REMAINING HALF OF THE FUND WOULD COME FROM TEN TO TWENTY OTHER "ARMED AND RICH" COUNTRIES. THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR SELECTION COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SSOD.

13. WARNKE SAID THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT AN AUTOMATIC LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. WE FORESEE SEVERE POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES ACCEPTING SUCH AN IDEA. SUCH AN IDEA WOULD MOST PROBABLY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO CONGRESS WERE WE SEEKING INCREASED DEFENSE BUDGETS AND THERE ARE NO GUARANTEED SAVINGS FROM FORTHCOMING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. WARNKE ALSO NOTED THAT SOME OF THE NATIONS BENEFITING FROM SUCH A FUND MIGHT WELL DIVERT THE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES INTO INCREASED ARMS PURCHASES. WARNKE SAID THERE IS A REALITY TO THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE US IS NOT REPEAT NOT OVERARMED.

14. TAITTINGER AGREED WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, BUT SAID THAT ONE MEASURE FOR

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EVALUATING ASSISTANCE TO THE LDCS WOULD BE TO LINK CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEW FUND WITH THE RATE AT WHICH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE MEETING THE GOAL OF 0.7 PERCENT OF GNP FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE LDCS. WARNKE QUESTIONED THE VIABILITY OF SUCH A LINKAGE. GERGORIN NOTED THAT PART OF THE GOF MOTIVATION STEMMED FROM MORAL CONSIDERATIONS. WARNKE DISAGREED WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT US DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE IMMORAL. TO THE CONTRARY THEY ARE MORAL IN THAT THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD. TAITTINGER SHIFTED THE GROUND FROM MORALS TO POLITICS, NOTING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE MORE EMBARRASSING TO THE SOVIETS THAN ANYONE ALSO.

15. NUCLEAR FREE ZONES: PAGNIEZ SAID THAT THE GOF

POSITION IS TO BE POSITIVE TOWARD NFZS PROVIDED THAT

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THE INITIATIVE COMES FROM THE REGION AND FINDS A CONSENSUS, AND THAT NECESSARY RIGHTS OF SHIPPING AND TRANSIT ARE OBSERVED. THE GOF IS CONSIDERING THE WORDING OF POSSIBLE NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES WHICH THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER. ON LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AGAIN THE GOF WILL LOOK FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND AGREEMENT BY ALL STATES IN A REGION, FOLLOWING WHICH THE GOF WOULD ABIDE BY ANY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO A REGION.

16. EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: PAGNIEZ SAID THAT THE MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN EUROPE IS THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. THE FRENCH WISH TO LIMIT THIS IMBALANCE. TO BE EFFECTIVE AN AREA LARGER THAN THAT ENCOMPASSED BY MBFR IS NEEDED. THUS THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE TO COVER ALL FORCES WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. A FIRST STEP COULD BE CBMS, WHICH COULD THEN BE FOLLOWED BY LIMITATIONS ON THE MORE DESTABILIZING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS (E.G., TANKS AND SOME AIRCRAFT). THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT WEAPONS IN THE US EARMARKED FOR EUROPE MAY HAVE TO BE INCLUDED. THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERING WHAT TO DO ABOUT SOVIET EQUIPMENT BEYOND THE URALS.

17. PAGNIEZ SAID THAT FRANCE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT INTRODUCE THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE PROJECT AT THE SSOD. RATHER, "AT A GIVEN MOMENT" FRANCE WILL TRY TO CONVENE A 35-NATION CONFERENCE AS THE FIRST STEP OF A LONG PROCESS.

18. COMMENTING ON PAGNIEZ'S REMARKS, WARNKE OBSERVED
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THAT WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. HE SAID LIMITATIONS ON TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS WOULD BE VERY, VERY DIFFICULT. IN REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, WARNKE FORESAW MASSIVE PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION AND AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONVENE SUCH A CONFERENCE AND LIMIT ITS CONSIDERATION TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS GIVEN

THAT THE 35 COUNTRIES WILL HAVE DISPARATE INTERESTS.
THE SOVIETS MAY WELL TRY TO INJECT FBS, FRENCH AND
BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES, AND THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.
WARNKE ALSO NOTED THE PROBLEM POSED BY DUAL CAPABLE
SYSTEMS. HE DOUBTED THAT ANY FORUM OF THIS SIZE

WOULD BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SERIOUS AND
COMPLEX ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

19. IN BRIEF CONCLUDING MEETING WITH FONMIN GUIRINGAUD
HE REITERATED STANDARD FRENCH RESERVATIONS IN REGARD
TO A CTB. GUIRINGAUD MENTIONED IN GENERAL TERMS FRENCH
CONCERNS ABOUT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE
IN THE EMERGING SALT II AGREEMENT. WARNKE STATED THAT
WE WOULD REJECT ANY NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE. GUIRINGAUD
ASKED THAT IN OUR PUBLIC COMMENTS US OFFICIALS STRESS
THAT THERE IS A CONTINUUM IN DETERRENCE SO THAT DIS-
CUSSION OF A "EUROSTRATEGIC BALANCE WILL NOT BE INTER-
PRETED IN SOME QUARTERS AS DECOUPLING. GUIRINGAUD
NOTED ALSO THAT THE GOF DID NOT THINK IT WISE TO
ATTEMPT TO EXCHANGE THE ER/RB FOR THE SS 20.
GUIRINGAUD THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT
DECISIONS ON THE ER/RB SHOULD BE MADE IN THE WEST
WITHOUT UNDUE SOVIET INTERFERENCE.
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